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Central banks worldwide have become more transparent. An important reason is 
that democratic societies expect more openness from public institutions. 
Policymakers also see transparency as a way to improve the predictability of 
monetary policy, thereby lowering interest rate volatility and contributing to 
economic stability. Most empirical studies support this view. However, there are 
three reasons why more research is needed. First, some (mostly theoretical) work 
suggests that transparency has an adverse effect on predictability. Second, 
empirical studies have mostly focused on average predictability before and after 
specific reforms in a small set of advanced economies. Third, less is known about 
the effect on interest rate volatility. To extend the literature, I use the Dincer and 
Eichengreen (2007) transparency index for twenty-four economies of varying 
income and examine the impact of transparency on both predictability and market 
volatility. I find that higher transparency improves the accuracy of interest rate 
forecasts for three months ahead and reduces rate volatility. 
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Central banks worldwide have become considerably more transparent about
monetary policy, including de￿ning their goals, explaining decisions, releasing
economic forecasts and providing guidance about future policy. Between 1998
and 2005, 89 of the 100 countries in the Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) index
show an increase in transparency and none a decline. An important reason is
that (the increased number of) democratic societies expect more openness from
public institutions. Another motivation for greater transparency is a reduction
in monetary policy surprises to thereby reduce accompanying ￿nancial market
and economic volatility. Along these lines, Bernanke (2004) asserts that, ￿clear
communication helps to increase the near-term predictability of [central bank]1
rate decisions, which reduces risk and volatility in ￿nancial markets and allows
for smoother adjustment of the economy to rate changes.￿This paper focuses
on the bene￿ts Bernanke describes, by examining transparency￿ s impact both
on predictability and interest rate volatility.
As discussed in the literature review in Section 2, Although straightforward
intuition and standard ￿nancial market theory suggest that transparency should
enhance predictability, this has been challenged by some theoretical and exper-
imental research, that shows that under some circumstances transparency can
reduce the use of private information and thereby actually damage predictabil-
ity.
Nevertheless, a considerable body of empirical research suggests that trans-
parency improves predictability. The focus in empirical work has largely been
on ￿xed income markets, for at least three reasons. First, they provide a readily
available measure of monetary policy expectations. Second, they provide the
most immediate avenue through which the central bank￿ s own interest rates
a⁄ect the economy. Third, central banks are often concerned with the volatil-
ity of interest rates and thus averse to surprising markets, as the quote above
illustrates.
Three approaches have been used to assess the impact of greater trans-
parency on predictability. First, testing the extent to which market prices
react to central bank decisions, second, examining forecast errors of expecta-
tions priced into the yield curve or futures and third, studying the accuracy of
predictions by professional forecasters.
Each approach has its own advantages and disadvantages. In this paper
I use private sector forecasts of money market interest rates for four reasons.
First, these represent a straightforward measure of expectations. Second, they
are available for a broad set of countries. Third, they are available for fore-
1Originally ￿FOMC￿ for the Federal Open Market Committee, the body that sets US
monetary policy; clearly the same reasoning applies to any other central bank.
1cast horizons out to a year. Fourth and importantly, it is possible to observe
individual forecasts.
Despite the signi￿cant number of papers, there is still room for improve-
ment in the empirical literature. Most studies only examine a limited number
of advanced countries. They do this largely by comparing average predictability
before and after speci￿c reforms in communication policy. As a result, there is
no real understanding of the relationship between varying levels of transparency
(across time and space) and corresponding variations in predictability. The re-
search presented in this paper addresses these gaps in the literature by utilizing
the Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) index along with professional interest rate
forecasts to study varying levels of transparency across 24 countries with di⁄er-
ing levels of economic development. Because one goal of improving monetary
policy predictability is to reduce ￿nancial market and economic volatility, this
paper also examines the impact of transparency on interest rate volatility.
To establish a relationship between transparency, predictability and interest
rate volatility requires measures of all three. In Section 3, I give a detailed
description of datasets that can be used to do this. To measure transparency I
employ the Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) index, which essentially counts the
number of transparency enhancing institutions of each central bank. To measure
predictability I use the error of professional interest rate forecasts at both three
and twelve month horizons. To measure interest rate volatility I use the historic
standard deviation of the same interest rates.
Section 4 describes formally how public information could impact forecasts of
interest rates and interest rate volatility. If an increase in transparency only im-
proves public information then it will result in individual forecasts that become
more accurate. However, if transparency has a negative impact on private infor-
mation, as the theoretical and experimental research discussed below suggests,
it could also lead to higher errors. Theoretically, market volatility behaves sim-
ilarly to predictability, more public information should dampen volatility unless
it hampers private information.
As shown in Section 5, simple graphs and panel regression results suggest
that transparency enhances predictability. Forecast errors decline signi￿cantly
at the three month horizon, but not at twelve months ahead. Transparency also
lowers volatility. Overall the evidence suggests that transparency can indeed
serve the goal outlined by Bernanke (2004), i.e. improving predictability helps
to foster lower interest rate volatility.
22 Review of the literature on predictability
The literature on central bank transparency and communication has grown
rapidly over the last decade and now consists of hundreds of papers and arti-
cles. Di⁄erent angles have been pursued. Many papers examine the implications
of transparency in theoretical macroeconomic models. Others examine empiri-
cally if transparency has in￿ uenced in￿ ation and other macroeconomic variables.
The impact of transparency on the ￿nancial markets has also been an impor-
tant theme in the literature. Especially around the turn of the century, many
articles examined if central bank communication had some impact on the ￿nan-
cial markets, generally concluding that it does. The question addressed here
goes a step further, asking whether transparency improves the predictability of
monetary policy in the ￿nancial markets. This section reviews the theoretical,
experimental and empirical evidence to date and highlights gaps in the liter-
ature that are addressed by research described in the remainder of the paper.
Blinder, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, de Haan and Jansen (2008) and van der Cruijsen
and Eij¢ nger (2007) o⁄er broader overviews of the literature on transparency.
2.1 Theory
Intuitively, one would expect better public information to improve market func-
tioning, in the sense that ￿nancial markets become better at predicting the
outcome of unrealized fundamentals. This is true in a basic rational expec-
tations asset market model with exogenous public and private information.2
Under di⁄erent assumptions or models, however, better public information can
hamper market functioning.
Probably the best known example is Morris and Shin (2002). They present
a model where the pro￿ts of individual agents depend not only on fundamental
values but also on the expectations of others (clearly an issue in any market
where assets can be sold before the realization of their fundamental value).
Under these circumstances a su¢ ciently clear signal from the central bank can
act as a coordinating point that could distract market participants from their
private information and possibly fundamentals. Svensson (2006) argues that this
conclusion is only valid for the unlikely situation where public signals are less
precise than private information. However, Demertzis and Hoeberichts (2007)
add costly information acquisition to Morris and Shin (2002)￿ s model and ￿nd
that it strengthens their result.
Another theoretical model by Dale, Orphanides and Osterholm (2008) demon-
strates that if the private sector is not able to learn the precision of the central
bank￿ s information, it may overreact to central bank communication. Kool et al.
2See Kool, Middeldorp and Rosenkranz (2011), where the case of exogenous private infor-
mation is equivalent to holding the fraction of informed traders constant.
3(2011) ￿nd that public information can crowd out investment in private informa-
tion, which hampers predictability, a conclusion supported by the experimental
work of Middeldorp and Rosenkranz (2011).
2.2 Empirical studies
Many empirical research papers have tried to assess if transparency improves
the predictability of monetary policy in the ￿nancial markets.3 The general
approach is to select a watershed communication reform and test the di⁄erence
between predictability before and afterwards. US studies typically use the ￿rst
announcement of the Federal Open Market Committee￿ s (FOMC) rate decisions
in February 1994, while for other countries the introduction of an in￿ ation
target, with its accompanying communication tools, is used. One can measure
predictability in at least three ways. The ￿rst is to ascertain how surprised
markets are by policy decisions. The second extracts expectations from the
yield curve or futures to see how accurate they are. The third uses professional
forecasts of interest rates. Taken together the evidence to date suggests that
transparency improves predictability.
The ￿rst approach to assessing the predictability of monetary policy involves
examining market movements close to policy decisions. Little reaction in money
market rates following a policy rate change suggests that it has been priced in
and that policy is predictable. Money market movements prior to the decision
in the same direction as the rate change can be interpreted as anticipating the
move. Swanson (2006) ￿nds that US interest rates show less reaction to Fed
decisions over the period where the Fed reformed its communication policy.
Holmsen, Qvigstad, ￿istein Rłisland and Solberg-Johansen (2008) ￿nd lower
volatility on the days the Norges Bank announced its decisions after it started
to release forecasts of its own interest rates. Murdzhev and Tomljanovich (2006)
and Coppel and Connolly (2003) show that policy changes are better anticipated
in, respectively, six and eight advanced economies. Although such an approach is
fairly intuitive and clear cut, its disadvantage is that it only provides a measure
of market expectations between meetings and at the time of rate announcements.
Communication reforms that allow market interest rates to anticipate monetary
policy earlier than one meeting ahead can￿ t be identi￿ed.
A second method is to measure market expectations of monetary policy
and examine how accurate these are. Typically expectations are either ex-
tracted from the yield curve or futures data. Here too, ￿ndings suggest that
3A related strand of the literature does not address predictability in the ￿nancial markets
but examines the usefulness of central bank communication in contructing forecasts of mon-
etary policy. Some studies have simply asked if communications contain predictive power in
itself; examples include Mizen (2009) and Jansen and de Haan (2009). Other studies exam-
ine if communication is useful in improving models that forecast monetary policy, such as
the Taylor rule; recent examples are Sturm and de Haan (2009) for the ECB and Hayo and
Neuenkirch (2009) for the FOMC.
4transparency improves predictability. Ra⁄erty and Tomljanovich (2002) and
Lange, Sack and Whitesell (2003) ￿nd better accuracy for the US Treasury
yield curve. Lildholdt and Wetherilt (2004) use a term structure model to show
an improvement in the predictability of UK monetary policy. Similarly, Toml-
janovich (2004) extracts expectations from bond yield curves and ￿nds that
forecast errors decline in seven advanced economies after transparency reforms.
Regarding futures rates, Swanson (2006) and Carlson, Craig, Higgins and
Melick (2006) ￿nd that the Fed funds futures are better able to predict US
monetary policy after communication reforms. Kwan (2007) concludes that
forward looking language or guidance, introduced in 2003, has helped to lower
the average error between the Fed funds futures and the actual outcome of the
Fed funds rate.
The disadvantage of using bond market expectations, is that such estimates
are likely to be biased. The failure of the expectations hypothesis for the Trea-
sury yield curve is a well-documented empirical result (e.g. Cochrane and Pi-
azzesi (2005), Campbell and Shiller (1991), Stambaugh (1988), Fama and Bliss
(1987)). Risk premiums on interest rates are positive on average and time-
varying. Sack (2004) and Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) show that Fed funds
futures rates also include risk premiums, particularly at longer maturities. Pi-
azzesi and Swanson (2008) demonstrate how to adjust Fed funds futures rates
for time-varying risk premiums using business cycle data. Middeldorp (2011)
contributes to the literature on transparency by applying their correction to the
question of the accuracy of the Fed funds futures.
A third approach is to use predictions by professional forecasters. These
are a direct measure of expectations, without risk premiums, and also allow
one to observe individual forecasts. There are several studies that look at US
interest rates. Swanson (2006) ￿nds an improvement in the accuracy of pri-
vate sector interest rate forecasts. Berger, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2006) ￿nd
that communication reduces the disparity of Fed funds target rate predictions
produced by forecasters from di⁄erent locations. Hayford and Malliaris (2007)
and Bauer, Eisenbeis, Waggoner and Zha (2006) ￿nd declining dispersion in US
T-bill forecasts. Regarding other central banks, Mariscal and Howells (2006b)
￿nd a growing dispersion of private sector forecasts of Bundesbank and ECB
monetary policy up to 2005, a result which runs counter to that for most others
studies, including that of their own (2006b) research for the Bank of England.
Several multi-country studies use professional forecasts, but they generally
focus on economic rather than interest rate forecasts. Johnson (2002) shows a
decline in in￿ ation forecasts, but not in errors or variance, in an eleven country
panel. Crowe (2006) ￿nds a convergence of in￿ ation forecasts for eleven in￿ a-
tion targeters. Crowe and Meade (2008) demonstrate a convergence of in￿ ation
forecasts in line with increasing transparency as measured by an index. Cec-
chetti and Hakkio (2009), on the other hand, do not ￿nd convincing evidence of
a reduction in the dispersion of in￿ ation forecasts in a sample of 15 countries.
5Ehrmann, Eij¢ nger and Fratzscher (2010) use various measures of central bank
transparency to show a convergence of professional forecasts of both economic
variables and interest rates in twelve advanced economies. To my knowledge,
there are no studies like the one presented in this paper, that focus on interest
rate forecasts using multi-country panel data.
A disadvantage of professional forecasts versus the expectations embedded in
interest rates is that it is not obvious that they are relevant to the transmission
of monetary policy. It is, nevertheless, likely that they both re￿ ect and in￿ uence
monetary policy expectations. Large ￿nancial institutions are the most common
employers of professional forecasters and their views are actively dispersed to
market participants and widely reported on in the press.
Although there is a signi￿cant number of empirical studies, they are lim-
ited in scope, both in their measure of transparency and geography. The vast
majority of the empirical research discussed above only shows that the average
predictability was higher after a particular communication reform than it was
before. This provides only a binary measure of transparency that gives little
sense of how much transparency has improved. Regarding geographic scope,
studies have been conducted for a limited number of advanced economies, typ-
ically one country at a time. To address these issues I use a measure of trans-
parency with a higher resolution, namely the Dincer and Eichengreen (2007)
index, which uses a 15 point scale. Combined with the available data on in-
terest rate forecasts, this produces a panel of 24 countries of varying levels of
income, which provides much greater geographic scope than earlier research.
63 Data
To establish the connection of transparency to interest rate predictability and
volatility, one needs adequate measures of all three. I use the Dincer and Eichen-
green (2007) index to measure transparency. It grades central banks according
to the di⁄erent types of information disclosed. Its main advantage is that it
covers a larger set of countries and periods than earlier measures.
Predictability is measured by the absolute error between private sector money
market forecasts reported by Consensus Economics and realized market rates.
The advantages and disadvantages of using professional forecasts were discussed
in the literature review.
To examine if transparency also impacts the volatility of interest rates, I also
incorporate the standard deviation of interest rates into the dataset.
Transparency is unlikely to be the only determinant of either predictability
or volatility. Therefore, to control for overall perceptions of risk I utilize the
commonly used ￿nancial risk indices of the PRS Group.
3.1 Transparency index
Di⁄erent measures of transparency have been assembled and corresponding data
collected by various researchers. The approach was pioneered by Eij¢ nger and
Geraats (2006), who measure transparency by scoring central banks on a check-
list of 15 di⁄erent types of disclosure, which are grouped into ￿ve categories: po-
litical, economic, procedural, policy and operational (see the Appendix). Their
measure of transparency is based on the simple idea that more types of dis-
closure represent greater transparency. A disadvantage is that the quality of
the information provided is neglected. On the other hand, precisely by avoid-
ing additional interpretation it is possible to create an objective measure of
transparency over a wide variety of central banks.
Eij¢ nger and Geraats (2006) only have data available for nine advanced
economies and for just the years 1998 and 2002. Crowe and Meade (2008) as-
semble data for 37 countries, following the same approach. Their data, however,
is only available for 1998 and 2006, but not in between. Dincer and Eichengreen
(2007) also employ the same method but gather data for a hundred countries
for every year between 1998 and 2005. The scope of their dataset clearly sur-
passes other data sources, which is why it is used in this paper. However, due
to the necessary availability of both the transparency data and the surveys of
professional forecasts discussed below, only 24 of the hundred countries studied
by Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) can be used.
7Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) compare the disclosure checklist to the prac-
tice of central banks as documented on their websites and in their statutes,
annual reports and other published documents. For some items half points are
awarded. The approach followed results in a score for each central bank of be-
tween 0 and 15 for each year. Where reforms were introduced during the year,
the score is based on the disclosures that existed during most of the year.
Levels of transparency vary greatly over the sample studied in this paper,
both over space and time. India only scores a 2 on the index compared to 13.5
for New Zealand in 2005 (see Figure 1 and Table 1). In between there is no
concentration at any particular level of transparency. Lower-income economies
tend to have lower levels of transparency, but this is not a hard-and-fast rule; the
Czech Republic and Hungary are more transparent than the US while Norway is
as transparent as Indonesia. Transparency has increased substantially over the
majority of the countries studied and no country saw a decrease in transparency
(see Figure 1 and Table 1). Although the three nations that show the largest
increase in transparency are lower-income economies, the rates of improvement
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Figure 1: Dincer and Eichengreen transparency index per country
9Country GDP per capita Transparency Transparency Forecasters Yrs×Frcstrs
 (PPP, 2002)  First Year Final Year
USA 36.3 7.5 8.5 98 - 05 8 38 304
Norway 33.0 6.0 8.0 98 - 05 8 19 152
Switzerland 32.0 6.0 9.5 98 - 05 8 18 144
Canada 29.3 10.5 10.5 98 - 05 8 25 200
Japan 28.7 8.0 9.5 98 - 05 8 38 304
Hong Kong 27.2 5.0 7.0 98 - 05 8 26 208
Australia 26.9 8.0 9.0 98 - 05 8 27 216
Germany 26.2 8.5 10.5 98 - 05 8 43 344
Sweden 26.0 9.0 13.0 98 - 05 8 22 176
UK 25.5 11.0 12.0 98 - 05 8 42 336
Singapore 25.2 2.5 6.5 8 28 224
N. Zealand 20.1 10.5 13.5 98 - 05 8 20 160
Korea, S. 19.6 6.5 8.5 98 - 05 8 27 216
Czech Rep. 15.3 9.0 11.5 98 - 03 6 32 192
Hungary 13.3 3.0 8.0 98 - 03 6 25 150
Slovakia 12.4 4.0 5.5 98 - 03 6 18 108
Argentina 10.5 3.0 5.5 01 - 04 4 24 96
Chile 10.1 7.5 7.5 '01 - 04 4 22 88
Poland 9.7 3.0 6.5 98 - 03 6 32 192
Mexico 8.9 4.0 5.5 '01 - 04 4 29 116
Malaysia 8.8 4.0 5.0 98 - 05 8 33 264
Thailand 7.0 2.0 8.0 98 - 05 8 27 216
Indonesia 3.1 3.0 8.0 98 - 05 8 27 216
India 2.6 2.0 2.0 98 - 05 8 26 208
Average 19.1 6.0 8.3 28 201
High 36.3 11.0 13.5 43 344
Low 2.6 2.0 2.0 18 88
Years
Table 1: GDP per capita, transparency and sample characteristics
103.2 Professional forecasts error and interest rate volatility
Several sources are available for professional interest rate forecasts. Informa-
tion services Bloomberg and Reuters conduct regular surveys of professional
forecasters as do central banks themselves, such as the Philadelphia Federal
Reserve and the ECB. Consensus Economics, however, surveys private sector
economic forecasters in a standardized way over a larger set of countries than
other sources.
Consensus Economics collects forecasts for short-term interest rates for a
variety of countries, typically of a three month maturity, either from government
bills, interbank rates or another benchmark rate. For some economies interest
rate forecasts are unavailable or have a di⁄erent maturity. These countries are
excluded from the sample. During the sample period, the three month maturity
is short enough that it can be considered to be essentially driven by monetary
policy and thus serves as the best available indicator of policy rates for which
forecasts are available for a wide set of countries.
Survey participants for a particular country are asked for their forecasts of
the three month money market rate of that country for both three and twelve
months in the future. More speci￿cally, every month survey participants are
asked for their interest rate forecasts for the end of the third subsequent calendar
month and the end of the same calendar month in the following year. For
example, the July 1999 survey presents forecasts for the end of October 1999
and the end of July 2000.
Consensus Economics does not collect interest rate forecasts for the Euro-
zone as a whole, but does so for several constituent countries. There is, however,
only one interbank rate for the entire monetary union.4 Using several Euro-zone
countries in the panel would create multiple observations regarding only the
European Central Bank. Instead, I use forecasts for just Germany. Not only is
Germany the largest economy in the Eurozone, it has by far the largest number
of forecasters.
The Consensus Economics data used are extracted from the hard copy book-
lets at the Hong Kong Monetary Authority library. The ￿Eastern Europe Con-
sensus Forecasts￿ were only available between 1998 and 2003 and the ￿Latin
American Consensus Forecasts￿between 2001 and April 2004. Over the sam-
ple the Consensus Economics surveys were conducted every month except for
Eastern Europe, for which the surveys were conducted every second month.
The closing date for the survey ranges from 8th to 14th day of the month for
industrialized and Asia-Paci￿c countries and from the 15th to 21st for Eastern
European and Latin American countries. To match the Dincer and Eichengreen
(2007) data, I use the survey results only for the month closest to the middle
4Except for the three month forecasted in 1998, the year before the euro was introduced.
11of the year. This is July in all cases except for Argentina, Chile and Mexico in
2004 where I use April.
Forecasts are collected by individual organization per country. These include
a variety of non-governmental entities such as independent or university a¢ li-
ated research institutes and economic consulting ￿rms. The majority, however,
are ￿nancial institutions varying from domestic and regional commercial banks
to global investment banks. There are 331 di⁄erent organizations providing
forecasts, with only 59 of these providing forecasts for more than one country.
In the cross-section forecasters are treated separately per country (i.e. a British
bank forecasting both the UK and the USA would count as two separate fore-
casters) resulting in a total of 658. Because forecasters rarely provide forecasts
for all years, the sample contains only 2236 forecasts for three months ahead
and 2191 forecasts for one year ahead.
To determine their accuracy, forecasts need to be compared to outcomes
three and twelve months down the road. To do so, data for the forecasted
interest rates were gathered from EcoWin, CEIC and Bloomberg. The absolute
di⁄erence between the individual forecast at t and the actual outcome at t +
3 months and t + 12 months forms a direct measure of the accuracy of the
individual forecasts.
To measure the volatility of interest rates I calculate the standard deviation
of interest rates using daily data for the three subsequent calendar months
(typically ￿rst day of August until the last day of October) and the following
twelve calendar months (typically ￿rst day of August to the last day of July the
following year). There are numerous forecasters per country, so the number of
individual forecast errors (2236 and 2191, as above) greatly exceeds the number
of observations for the volatility measure (172).
To graphically illustrate the general development of forecast errors per coun-
try I also calculate the absolute di⁄erence between the average forecast (i.e. the
￿consensus￿ of forecasters) and the actual interest rate at t + 3 months and
t + 12 months. Results are charted in Figure 2. As one might expect, the 3
month errors are generally smaller than the 12 month errors. Errors and their
variation are particularly large for countries that experienced ￿nancial and eco-
nomic crisis during this period, Argentina in particular dramatically stands out.
The 1998 ￿nancial market crisis a⁄ects several countries in the sample partic-
ularly Asian and developing economies. The consequences of this shock vary
substantially, however, with peak errors varying from 0.5%-point for Japan to
20%-point for Indonesia. The 2001 recession is also visible for a minority of ad-
vanced economies. Overall, forecast errors vary substantially per country (also
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Figure 2: Absolute error of average forecast (%-point)
13Figure 3 shows that patterns in the volatility data are analogous to those
described for the forecast errors. Here too the Asia crisis is visible, and again
there are substantial di⁄erences in its impact. As with the errors data, di⁄er-
ences between countries are large, both in terms of volatility levels (See Table
2) and variations over time.
The main di⁄erence in Figure 3 versus Figure 2 is that the three month and
twelve month volatilities appear closer together than the corresponding errors
for these time frames. Given that the standard deviation of daily interest rates
is, by de￿nition, calculated over a sample period, this is not surprising for two
reasons. First, the three month sample overlaps a quarter of the twelve month
sample. Second, the average date of the samples are closer together, i.e. t+1:5
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Figure 3: Standard deviation of daily money market rates
15Forecast errors and ￿nancial market volatility re￿ ect more than just the
transparency of the central bank. Both are a⁄ected by overall predictability of
interest rates due to the economic and ￿nancial risks that a⁄ect them. To control
for country risk in the analysis below, I utilize the economic and ￿nancial risk
indicators of the International Country Risk Guide of the Political Risk Services
(PRS) Group. According to Linder and Santiso (2002) these ratings are used
by around four-￿fths of the companies on Fortune magazine￿ s list of largest
multinationals. The ￿nancial and economics risk ratings are constructed with
objective data that are weighed together according to prede￿ned scales.5 Higher
ratings indicate less risk. The economic risk rating is constructed from GDP per
head, real GDP growth, in￿ ation, general government balance as a percentage of
GDP and current account as a percentage of GDP. The components of ￿nancial
risk are foreign debt as a percentage of GDP, foreign debt service as a percentage
of exports of goods and services, current account as percentage of exports of
goods and services, o¢ cial reserves import cover and year-on-year exchange rate
movement. Essentially the risk ratings provide a standardized and parsimonious
way to re￿ ect a variety of economic and ￿nancial fundamentals that a⁄ect risk.
A downside may be that the ratings may not re￿ ect di⁄erences in the ability
of countries to maintain government and current account de￿cits or carry debt,
see for example the relatively low ratings of some developed countries in Figure
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Figure 4: Political Risk Services indices
17Country Average Average Average Average Average Average
|Error| |Error| Volatility Volatility  Risk Rating  Risk Rating
t+3 t+12 t to t+3  t to t+12  Economic  Financial
USA 0.4 1.2 0.2 0.5 40.1 35.2
Norway 0.7 1.4 0.3 1.0 46.7 47.1
Switzerland 0.4 1.2 0.2 0.3 44.3 46.1
Canada 0.5 1.1 0.2 0.4 42.5 40.3
Japan 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 37.9 46.8
Hong Kong 0.7 1.4 0.5 0.7 43.3 43.9
Australia 0.3 0.7 0.1 0.3 40.5 35.3
Germany 0.3 1.0 0.1 0.3 40.5 40.4
Sweden 0.4 0.8 0.1 0.3 43.7 37.5
UK 0.5 1.2 0.1 0.3 40.0 38.5
Singapore 0.9 1.0 0.4 0.5 47.3 45.4
N. Zealand 0.8 1.1 0.4 0.6 40.2 30.2
Korea, S. 1.3 1.6 0.3 0.4 40.6 38.9
Czech Rep. 0.6 2.3 0.1 0.6 34.4 39.3
Hungary 0.9 1.6 0.3 1.1 34.4 36.6
Slovakia 1.6 2.1 0.7 1.1 32.5 36.8
Argentina 18.3 32.7 3.6 8.4 34.5 26.3
Chile 1.0 1.2 0.4 0.5 38.9 37.3
Poland 2.1 3.3 0.5 1.2 34.7 38.8
Mexico 1.1 2.4 1.4 2.2 37.0 36.9
Malaysia 0.5 1.1 0.5 0.8 38.9 40.1
Thailand 2.0 2.8 0.9 1.3 38.0 38.6
Indonesia 2.2 4.5 0.5 1.8 31.8 31.1
India 0.7 0.9 0.4 0.6 33.6 40.9
Average 1.6 2.9 0.5 1.1 39.0 38.7
High 18.3 32.7 3.6 8.4 47.3 47.1
Low 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 31.8 26.3
Table 2: Absolute average error, volatility and risk ratings
184 A simple theoretical approach to public and
private information
Here I describe how transparency might have either a positive or negative e⁄ect
on predictability in a very general but formal way. Along the lines of the dataset
employed below, consider a number of central banks, each with an accompanying
set of professional forecasters who make predictions of future policy rates.
A simple way to think about individual forecasts is as combinations of public
and private information, which are both noisy signals of future policy rates.
The noise in the signals are random errors that are assumed to be unbiased
and independently normally distributed. In the context of the data used, these
signals have a year index, t, but I suppress the subscript in this section because
it applies to all variables.







b future policy rate
!k error of public signal for country k
k country index
￿ precision of public signal error (i.e. inverse of the variance)





pi;k private signal of forecaster i for country k
i forecaster index
!i;k error of private signal of forecaster i for country k
si;k precision of private signal error (i.e. inverse of the variance)
Assuming the forecaster aims to maximize accuracy, knows the precisions of
the public and private signals, and behaves rationally, the individual forecast,
fi;k, will be a combination of private and public signals, using relative precisions
as weights.




The error of the individual forecast with the future interest rate, ￿i;k , is
derived by subtracting b from the forecast.




A convenient property of signals with normally and independently distrib-
uted errors is that the combined signal has a precision that is the sum of the
precisions of the individual signals. Equation (5) thus represents the precision
of the forecast error, ￿i;k.
(5) ￿i;k = ￿k + si;k
It seems likely that transparency will increase the precision of the public
information. Equation (6) de￿nes ￿k to be a function of transparency (￿) and
some other determinants Dk.
(6) ￿k = ￿￿ (+￿;Dk)
Where
￿ transparency
Dk vector of other determinants of the precision of public information
It is less clear if transparency will a⁄ect private information. In Equation
(4) the weight on public information will increase as it becomes more precise
and the weight on private information will decline, while the precision of private
information will remain unchanged. It may be the case, however, that the preci-
sion itself is also a⁄ected. In line with the reasoning of Morris and Shin (2002),
agents may partially ignore their own private information because the public
signal acts as a coordinator of second degree expectations and thus becomes
over-emphasized in determining the resale value of the asset. Kool et al. (2011)
also raise the possibility that when private information is costly individual fore-
casters will invest less in the precision of the private signal. Both cases imply a
negative relationship between transparency and private information.
(7) si;k = ￿s (￿￿;Di;k)
As a result, the relationship between transparency and predictability will be
a function of transparency￿ s separate e⁄ects on the public and private signals.
(8) ￿i;k = ￿￿ (+￿;Dk) + ￿s (￿￿;Di;k)
Kool et al. (2011) show that in a rational expectations asset market the
a⁄ect of transparency on volatility is theoretically the same as its a⁄ect on
predictability. They show that transparency can crowd out private information
and thereby both hurt predictability and push up volatility.
It is quite possible that in order to closely model the relationship between
transparency and the precisions of private and public information a more com-
plex setup would be required. For example, to represent the idea of Dale et al.
(2008) that forecasters may misestimate the precision of the public signal would
20require adjusting the above equations to make a distinction between the actual
precisions and those that the forecasters perceive and thus use as weights. Fur-
thermore, Berger et al. (2006) note that forecasters di⁄er in their analysis of
public information, indicating some complementaries between public and pri-
vate data. More generally, the approach used here requires assuming rational
agents that are able to optimally combine information, precluding the type of
confusion from multiple signals found in Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007). These
papers indicate that the simple approach employed here leaves many paths unex-
plored. However, it is not my intention to construct a unifying theoretical model
that could incorporate all potential adverse e⁄ects of greater transparency. In-
stead my goal is to provide a basic theoretical benchmark for interpreting the
econometric results presented in the next section.
5 Evidence
Below I present regression results for the relationship between transparency
and forecaster errors, followed by similar analysis for transparency￿ s impact
on interest rate volatility. First, however, I present two graphs to illustrate
the cross-country relationship of transparency with both forecast accuracy and
volatility. Both the graphs and the econometric evidence point to the conclusion
that transparency helps to improve accuracy and reduce volatility.
5.1 Cross section graphs
Graphs o⁄er an intuitive way to illustrate the consequences of transparency for
predictability and interest rate volatility. Their downside is that any relationship
that is visually apparent may not stand the scrutiny of econometric analysis.
However, as I present such analysis in subsequent sections, it is a useful ￿rst step
to show that at least the super￿cial relationships one would expect are present in
the cross-section of the data. Assuming that negative e⁄ects of transparency on
private information do not dominate, countries with higher transparency should
have lower absolute forecast errors and lower interest rate volatility. Indeed, that
is what the scatter plots presented in Figures 5 and 6 suggest.
The graphs show a dot for each country in the sample except Argentina,
which has average errors and volatility well above that of the other countries
(See Table 2). Rather than looking at a speci￿c year, the levels of transparency,
forecast errors and volatility are averaged over the ￿ve years of the sample.
I focus on the 3-month forecasts and volatilities. The black lines represent
ordinary least squares linear regressions ￿tted on the datapoints shown.
21Figure 5: Transparency and forecast accuracy, country cross section
22Figure 6: Transparency and interest rate volatility, country cross-section
5.2 Forecast accuracy
Having illustrated graphically that the cross-section shows a negative relation-
ship between transparency and both forecast errors and interest rate volatil-
ity, the next step is to utilize the full panel for a more complete econometric
analysis that controls adequately for country features other than central bank
transparency. This section does this for forecast errors and the next one for
interest rate volatility.
The results shown below are obtained from the following panel regression









￿ = ￿￿k;t + ￿ek;t + ￿lk;t + ￿di;k;t + c + "i;k;t
Where
￿ forecast error
m forecast months ahead (3,12)
k country index
i forecaster index
t time index (1998, 1999 ... 2005)
￿ parameters to estimate
￿ transparency index
e PRS economic risk rating




Most of equation (9) is a straightforward incorporation of the variables dis-
cussed in Section 1. The absolute error of the individual forecasts is the de-
pendent variable. The transparency index and the risk indices are the main
independent variables. Forecaster ￿xed e⁄ects are used because the Breusch
and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random e⁄ects clearly rejects the null
hypothesis of random e⁄ects (p-value = 0.0000) regardless of whether or not time
dummies are also included in the regression. Time dummies are not included
because the Wald test does not ￿nd them to be jointly signi￿cant (p-value =
0.1483). The speci￿cation tests are based on the regression on the three month
forecast error with the entire sample.
Because it is likely that the individual forecaster errors are correlated within
a country, I use robust standard errors that correct for such clustering. The
consequences are substantial. The correction roughly triples the standard error
for the transparency index.6
The output from the regression in Equation (9) is presented in Table 4.
Results are shown for both the t + 3 month and t + 12 forecast errors and for
both the full sample and several sub-samples based on geography and income
level. A per capita GDP at PPP of $25000 is the best point to split the sample
because it creates approximately equally sized samples and there is a signi￿cant
gap in income between the two countries on either side of the split (see Table
1). An overview of the countries included in the samples is provided in Table 3.
6Errors may also be correlated within organizations across countries, when international
organizations provide forecasts for several countries. I examined a correction for this and found
that the results were essentially identical and thus I do not use it in the results presented.
24GDP per capita > $25k GDP per capita < $25k
Asia-Pacific Australia, Hong Kong,
Japan, Singapore
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, N.
Zealand, S. Korea, Thailand




Americas Canada, USA Argentina, Chile, Mexico
Table 3: Sample matrix
Overall the results in Table 4 suggest that higher monetary policy trans-
parency is e⁄ective in improving predictability of money market rates three
months into the future. The full sample regression indicates an average 0.3%-
point reduction in the t+3 month absolute forecast error. The reduction is not
only statistically signi￿cant, but also economically signi￿cant considering the
average absolute error of 1.6%-point reported in Table 2. Results vary some-
what across the sub-samples. The impact of transparency is negative in all of
the samples, but not signi￿cant in the case of countries with lower per capita
income and the Americas. Insigni￿cance there is the result of larger standard
errors rather than a smaller coe¢ cient, which are similar across all subsamples
except for the Americas. The latter is a⁄ected by the large forecast errors for
Argentina in a small sample of only ￿ve countries. The overall results, however,
are not substantively altered by removing Argentina, although the coe¢ cient
for the low income sample becomes marginally signi￿cant (See Table 5).
25t+3m forecast error
coeff. p coeff. p coeff. p
transparency -0.30 0.03 ** -0.21 0.02 ** -0.30 0.23
PRS financial risk index -0.25 0.13 -0.01 0.73 -0.39 0.15
PRS economic risk index -0.30 0.12 -0.01 0.50 -0.38 0.15
c 25.02 0.07 * 3.19 0.05 ** 32.07 0.08 *
R² 0.17 0.10 0.27
countries 24 11 13
observations 2236 1308 928
coeff. p coeff. p coeff. p
transparency -0.39 0.04 ** -0.21 0.05 * -9.55 0.31
PRS financial risk index -0.19 0.06 * 0.00 0.95 -0.93 0.24
PRS economic risk index -0.08 0.21 -0.07 0.07 * -0.03 0.93
c 14.24 0.01 *** 5.47 0.06 * 113.23 0.23
R² 0.33 0.27 0.20
countries 10 9 5
observations 895 885 444
full sample GDP per capita > 25k GDP per capita < 25k
Americas Europe Asia-Pacific
t+12m forecast error
coeff. p coeff. p coeff. p
transparency -0.41 0.23 -0.07 0.58 -0.60 0.36
PRS financial risk index -0.28 0.04 ** -0.06 0.17 -0.46 0.12
PRS economic risk index -0.25 0.06 * 0.05 0.46 -0.29 0.04 **
c 25.92 0.02 ** 1.95 0.59 34.53 0.02 **
R² 0.16 0.07 0.22
countries 24 11 13
observations 2191 1291 900
coeff. p coeff. p coeff. p
transparency -0.23 0.06 * -0.02 0.90 -4.50 0.25
PRS financial risk index -0.33 0.01 *** -0.15 0.13 -0.48 0.24
PRS economic risk index -0.09 0.35 -0.32 0.03 ** -0.92 0.08 *
c 19.72 0.00 *** 20.60 0.01 *** 90.80 0.10 *
R² 0.29 0.19 0.23
countries 10 9 5
observations 867 880 456
full sample GDP per capita > 25k GDP per capita < 25k
Americas Europe Asia-Pacific
Table 4: Transparency and forecast errors
26t+3m forecast error
coeff. p coeff. p
transparency -0.27 0.01 ** -0.29 0.09 *
PRS financial risk index -0.09 0.09 * -0.14 0.12
PRS economic risk index -0.11 0.03 ** -0.15 0.10 *





coeff. p coeff. p
transparency -0.14 0.26 -0.11 0.52
PRS financial risk index -0.18 0.02 ** -0.23 0.13
PRS economic risk index -0.16 0.06 * -0.27 0.02 **




full sample GDP per capita < 25k
full sample GDP per capita < 25k
Table 5: Transparency and forecast errors, without Argentina
Regarding the t + 12 month forecast errors, results do not warrant the con-
clusion that transparency improves predictability. The estimated impact of
transparency is greater for the complete sample and some of the subsamples
unless Argentina is removed. In any case, the larger standard errors mean the
estimates are not statistically signi￿cant except for the Asia-Paci￿c region.
The ￿t of the regression tends to be best for the samples that contain fewer
advanced countries. The best explanation for this is that the PRS risk indices
are better at explaining forecast errors for these countries. Considering that
overall economic and ￿nancial risk is probably a more important factor in these
countries, this makes sense. The signi￿cance of the PRS risk indices is some-
what obscured, however, by the 50% correlation of the economic and ￿nance
indicators. As result they are not separately signi￿cant in many cases, but do
have better joint signi￿cance.
Overall, the results both support and expand the conclusion of earlier em-
pirical research that transparency improves predictability. The approach here
27improves on earlier research by actually measuring the relationship between a
transparency index and predictability, so that it is possible to say how much
transparency leads to how much predictability. It adds to the robustness of the
conclusion by con￿rming it across a variety of countries. Although the e⁄ect
is only weakly signi￿cant for the low income sample without Argentina, the
consistency of the coe¢ cient suggests that it does apply to most countries, but
cannot be established as strongly signi￿cant due to the larger standard errors.
The di⁄erence between transparency￿ s e⁄ect on predictability on the three
month and twelve month forecast horizons suggests potential limits to the ben-
e￿ts of transparency. It seems plausible that any information asymmetries be-
tween policy makers and professional forecasters are likely to be greatest in the
short term where the former group has, at the very least, a unique insight into
their own views about incoming data and the economic outlook. As I ￿nd,
greater transparency thus has more potential to improve the precision of public
information at shorter timeframes. At longer forecast horizons such informa-
tion asymmetries are less obvious as the economic future becomes cloudier for
all. It is thus not surprising to ￿nd that evidence of improved transparency
at the twelve month forecast horizon is very weak and inconsistent across sam-
ples. It is possible, however, that there is some scope for central banks to share
information about the longer term outlook that has not been fully utilized.
5.3 Interest rate volatility
A potential bene￿t of improved monetary policy predictability is that it may
lead to lower interest rate volatility. To examine the connection between trans-
parency and interest rate volatility, I conduct a similar panel regression analysis







￿ ￿ = ￿￿k;t + ￿ek;t + ￿lk;t + ￿dk;t + c + "i;k;t
Where
￿ standard deviation of daily money market rates, from t to t + m
While the dependent variable is now a measure of interest rate volatility,
the independent variables in Equation (10) are the same as in Equation (9). As
above, the Breusch and Pagan test rejects the random e⁄ects speci￿cation, both
with and without time ￿xed e⁄ects (p-value of 0.0068 and 0.0085 respectively).
The Wald test rejects the joint signi￿cance of the time dummies (p-value of
0.1345), so no time ￿xed e⁄ects are included.
28t+3m daily standard deviation of 3m interest rate
coeff. p coeff. p coeff. p
transparency -0.11 0.10 -0.12 0.00 *** -0.13 0.26
PRS financial risk index -0.08 0.23 0.01 0.58 -0.14 0.21
PRS economic risk index -0.09 0.12 -0.05 0.25 -0.06 0.45
c 7.97 0.04 ** 2.81 0.10 8.89 0.05 *
R² 0.51 0.39 0.50
countries 24 11 13
observations 172 88 84
coeff. p coeff. p coeff. p
transparency -0.14 0.00 *** -0.14 0.02 ** -1.75 0.00 ***
PRS financial risk index -0.04 0.24 0.06 0.29 -0.24 0.18
PRS economic risk index -0.01 0.61 0.00 0.91 -0.33 0.06 *
c 3.50 0.00 *** -0.96 0.74 36.08 0.00 ***
R² 0.55 0.27 0.91
countries 10 9 5
observations 80 64 28
full sample GDP per capita > 25k GDP per capita < 25k
Asia-Pacific Europe Americas
t+12m daily standard deviation of 3m interest rate
coeff. p coeff. p coeff. p
transparency -0.32 0.14 -0.10 0.01 ** -0.13 0.26
PRS financial risk index -0.09 0.24 -0.03 0.10 -0.14 0.21
PRS economic risk index -0.09 0.31 -0.05 0.16 -0.06 0.45
c 10.68 0.02 ** 4.48 0.01 *** 8.89 0.05 *
R² 0.51 0.52 0.50
countries 24 11 13
observations 172 88 84
coeff. p coeff. p coeff. p
transparency -0.32 0.14 -0.10 0.01 ** -0.49 0.21
PRS financial risk index -0.12 0.13 -0.02 0.62 -0.51 0.21
PRS economic risk index -0.07 0.40 -0.14 0.02 ** 0.64 0.22
c 9.09 0.05 ** 7.98 0.01 *** 45.99 0.00 ***
R² 0.46 0.51 0.82
countries 10 9 5
observations 80 64 28
full sample GDP per capita > 25k GDP per capita < 25k
Asia-Pacific Europe Americas
Table 6: Transparency and forecast volatility
29Results for the entire sample suggest that transparency does not have a
signi￿cant impact on the standard deviation of interest rates for the t to t + 3
period. However, all but one of the subsamples shows a signi￿cant impact.
The size of the estimated e⁄ect is similar across all subsamples, except for the
Americas subsample, where the estimate is probably largely driven by the high
volatility of Argentina￿ s interest rates in a small sample. The estimates for the
entire sample and the subsamples are also economically meaningful considering
the average standard deviation of 0.5%-point reported in Table 2.
The evidence for the impact of transparency on the standard deviation of
interest rates for the t to t+12 period is weaker. Results are only signi￿cant for
high income countries and Europe subsamples. There the reduction in volatility
is similar in scale to the results for the t to t + 3 period.
Unlike the results for the forecast errors, removing Argentina from the sam-
ple has a substantial impact on the signi￿cance of the results.
t+3m daily standard deviation of 3m interest rate
coeff. p coeff. p
transparency -0.14 0.00 *** -0.16 0.00 ***
PRS financial risk index 0.00 0.96 -0.02 0.68
PRS economic risk index -0.03 0.12 -0.01 0.70




t+12m daily standard deviation of 3m interest rate
coeff. p coeff. p
transparency -0.11 0.03 ** -0.11 0.28
PRS financial risk index -0.07 0.14 -0.08 0.38
PRS economic risk index -0.10 0.17 -0.11 0.37




full sample GDP per capita < 25k
full sample GDP per capita < 25k
Table 7: Transparency and interest rate volatility,
without Argentina
30Without Argentina, the full sample results are clearly signi￿cant for both the
three month and twelve month volatility measures. The three month volatility
measure for the low income countries is also highly signi￿cant.
As noted in the section on data, the time frames of the volatility measure
are, in practice, somewhat di⁄erent than that of the forecast errors, helping to
explain why the coe¢ cients for three and twelve month volatility are closer to-
gether than for the forecast errors. Nevertheless, the overall pattern runs parallel
to that of the forecast errors: transparency reduces volatility and the reduction
is greater at a shorter time frame and fades over a longer time frame. The the-
oretical prediction, presented in the Section 2, that transparency, predictability
and market stability are closely related is therefore supported by these results.
Likewise, the purported bene￿t of transparency at fostering ￿nancial market
stability is supported by the evidence presented above.
6 Conclusion
Central bankers have sought to improve the predictability of monetary policy
as a way to reduce interest rate volatility and thereby enhance economic sta-
bility. While some theoretical and experimental papers, including contributions
by the author, suggest that central bank transparency might actually harm pre-
dictability by hampering the use of private information, most empirical work has
found these concerns to be unwarranted. Such research, however, has generally
only compared average predictability before and after some watershed trans-
parency reform and done so only for a limited number of advances economies.
My approach has a broader scope because I examine the relationship between
the Dincer and Eichengreen transparency index and predictability for twenty-
four countries with varying levels of income. Furthermore, I use professional
forecasts, which have seen limited use in multi-country predictability analysis.
Finally, I also examine interest rate volatility, to see if predictability and trans-
parency do indeed go hand-in-hand, something which is not extensively done in
the literature.
The results provide improved empirical evidence that supports the general
￿nding that transparency is bene￿cial and does so for a broad set of coun-
tries. Forecast errors decline signi￿cantly for the three month ahead forecasts,
although not at the horizon of one year. My evidence also suggests that the
volatility of interest rates do indeed track predictability. Greater transparency
is accompanied by a signi￿cant decline in interest rate volatility.
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347 APPENDIX ￿Transparency Checklist
Text copied directly from Appendix of Dincer and Eichengreen (2007)
This appendix describes the construction of the transparency index. The
index is the sum
of the scores for answers to the ￿fteen questions below (min = 0, max = 15).
1. Political Transparency
Political transparency refers to openness about policy objectives. This com-
prises a formal statement of objectives, including an explicit prioritization in
case of multiple goals, a quanti￿cation of the primary objective(s), and explicit
institutional arrangements.
(a) Is there a formal statement of the objective(s) of monetary policy, with
an explicit prioritization in case of multiple objectives?
No formal objective(s) = 0.
Multiple objectives without prioritization = 1/2.
One primary objective, or multiple objectives with explicit priority = 1.
(b) Is there a quanti￿cation of the primary objective(s)?
No = 0.
Yes = 1.
(c) Are there explicit contacts or other similar institutional arrangements
between the monetary authorities and the government?
No central bank contracts or other institutional arrangements = 0.
Central bank without explicit instrument independence or contract = 1/2.
Central bank with explicit instrument independence or central bank contract
although possibly subject to an explicit override procedure = 1.
2. Economic Transparency
Economic transparency focuses on the economic information that is used
for monetary policy. This includes economic data, the model of the economy
that the central bank employs to construct forecasts or evaluate the impact of
its decisions, and the internal forecasts (model based or judgmental) that the
central bank relies on.
35(a) Is the basic economic data relevant for the conduct of monetary policy
publicly available? (The focus is on the following ￿ve variables: money supply,
in￿ ation, GDP, unemployment rate and capacity utilization.)
Quarterly time series for at most two out of the ￿ve variables = 0.
Quarterly time series for three or four out of the ￿ve variables = 1/2.
Quarterly time series for all ￿ve variables = 1.




(c) Does the central bank regularly publish its own macroeconomic forecasts?
No numerical central bank forecasts for in￿ ation and output = 0.
Numerical central bank forecasts for in￿ ation and/or output published at
less than quarterly frequency = 1/2.
Quarterly numerical central bank forecasts for in￿ ation and output for the
medium term (one to two years ahead), specifying the assumptions about the
policy instrument (conditional or unconditional forecasts) = 1.
3. Procedural Transparency
Procedural transparency is about the way monetary policy decisions are
taken.
(a) Does the central bank provide an explicit policy rule or strategy that
describes its monetary policy framework?
No = 0.
Yes = 1.
(b) Does the central bank give a comprehensive account of policy deliber-
ations (or explanations in case of a single central banker) within a reasonable
amount of time?
No or only after a substantial lag (more than eight weeks) = 0.
Yes, comprehensive minutes (although not necessarily verbatim or attributed)
or explanations (in case of a single central banker), including a discussion of
backward and forward-looking arguments = 1.
36(c) Does the central bank disclose how each decision on the level of its main
operating instrument or target was reached?
No voting records, or only after substantial lag (more than eight weeks) =
0.
Non-attributed voting records = 1/2.
Individual voting records, or decision by single central banker = 1.
4. Policy Transparency
Policy transparency means prompt disclosure of policy decisions, together
with an explanation of the decision, and an explicit policy inclination or indi-
cation of likely future policy actions.
(a) Are decisions about adjustments to the main operating instrument or
target announced promptly?
No or only after the day of implementation = 0.
Yes, on the day of implementation = 1.
(b) Does the central bank provide an explanation when it announces policy
decisions?
No = 0.
Yes, when policy decisions change, or only super￿cially = 1/2.
Yes, always and including forwarding-looking assessments = 1.
(c) Does the central bank disclose an explicit policy inclination after every





Operational transparency concerns the implementation of the central bank￿ s
policy actions. It involves a discussion of control errors in achieving operating
targets and (unanticipated) macroeconomic disturbances that a⁄ect the trans-
mission of monetary policy. Furthermore, the evaluation of the macroeconomic
outcomes of monetary policy in light of its objectives is included here as well.
(a) Does the central bank regularly evaluate to what extent its main policy
operating targets (if any) have been achieved?
37No or not very often (at less than annual frequency) = 0.
Yes but without providing explanations for signi￿cant deviations = 1/2.
Yes, accounting for signi￿cant deviations from target (if any); or, (nearly)
perfect control over main operating instrument/target = 1.
(b) Does the central bank regularly provide information on (unanticipated)
macroeconomic disturbances that a⁄ect the policy transmission process?
No or not very often = 0.
Yes but only through short-term forecasts or analysis of current macroeco-
nomic developments (at least quarterly) = 1/2.
Yes including a discussion of past forecast errors (at least annually) = 1.
(c) Does the central bank regularly provide an evaluation of the policy out-
come in light of its macroeconomic objectives?
No or not very often (at less than annual frequency) = 0.
Yes but super￿cially = 1/2.
Yes, with an explicit account of the contribution of monetary policy in meet-
ing the objectives = 1.
38